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4. R E L I A B  I L l T Y  
Seymour C. Himmel 
Both NASA and the electric power industry are involved in the design, building, 
and operation of large and complex systems. These systems must operate effi- 
ciently and reliably. Failure can result in tremendous economic losses. 
tion of modest incremental advances in technology as new plants were built. This 
relatively slow pace permitted careful and detailed investigation of the effects of the 
incorporation of these advances. In the process of preparing for this conference, it 
became evident that the electric power industry is on the threshold of the application 
of large advances in technology. This is quite similar to the situation in the late 
1950's when, in order to undertake the space flight program, NASA had to take a 
large step in technology. 
Such a step can, and in that case did, lead to difficulties. It is well known that 
in those days the space program was plagued by a lack of reliability in the systems 
being tried. To illustrate how bad the situation was, consider just the launch vehi- 
cles. In 1959, only 57 percent of the attempted launches succeeded. In 1960, only 
59 percent met their flight objectives. 
This was obviously a very unsatisfactory state of affairs. Upon close examina- 
tion of the situation, it was found that. the complexity of the systems, the new tech- 
nology that was being used, and the rapid pace at which the systems were being de- 
veloped all contributed to the poor performance obtained. Moreover, once the hard- 
ware was  committed to flight, i f  something malfunctioned, it was not possible to get 
at  it  to find out what had happened - let alone to fix it. The electric power industry 
is fast approaching a similar situation. With some of the new reactors for power 
generation, one might as well be in space a s  it is frequently not possible to get at 
the hardware once a malfunction occurs. 
for improving and maintaining the reliability and quality of the hardware. That the 
methodology is effective is illustrated by the fact that, in contrast to the less-than- 
60-percent success level previously noted, last year a 93-percent level was attained 
for the launching of twice as many vehicles. These vehicles, moreover, were of 
even larger size and greater complexity than those of 8 years ago. 
In the past, the electric power industry has been characterized by the applica- 
In order to overcome the problems encountered, NASA developed a methodology 
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The purpose of this paper is to acquaint you with this methodology. There are 
obviously many differences in our fields of endeavor, and all that is done to enhance 
the reliability of space systems may not be applicable or  war 
dustry. But, it is believed that many of these techniques s 
their application may permit the power industry 
countered in the space program. 
There a re  two basic parts to this methodology. The first is called reliability 
engineering and the second is called quality assurance. Where one ends and the 
other begins is a moot point. A somewhat arbitrary definition is used in this paper. 
What is important is that both are necessary. 
In reliability engineering, it is established, by detailed examination and control 
of design, that a system is inherently reliable and, by test, that it can perform as 
desired. This process is called "qualifying" the system. In quality assurance, 
both inspection and testing are used to ensure that the system delivered by the man- 
ufacturer is as designed. 
Al l  of this sounds like an involved way of saying: "Use good engineering prac- 
tice. '' In fact, that is all it is. It has been found, however, that today this is not 
the norm. Whether this results from the complexity of the systems, the rapid pace 
of development, the compartmentalization or  specialization of engineers, o r  com- 
binations thereof, is difficult to assess. The fact is that the problem does exist, and 
NASA has been forced to live with it. 
avoid some of the pitfalls en- 
RELIABILITY ENGINEERING 
Reliability must be engineered into a system, it doesn't just happen. Relia- 
bility engineering consists, of two basic parts, design and test. Some of the ele- 
ments under these two major subdivisions are as follows: 
(1) Design 
(a) Design criteria 
(b) Design practices 
(c) Design reviews 
(d) Reliability analyses 
(e) Failure mode analyses 
(a) Breadboard 
(b) Prototype 
(c) Qualification of piece part, component, subsystem, system, and 
(2) Testing 
combined systems 
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Each of these elements plays an important role in the process of achieving a reliable 
system. A l l  are required in order to attain a reliable system. Consider first the 
design of the system. 
Design Criteria 
After  establishing what sort  of system is required, that is, what it is to do and, 
conceptually, how it is to do it, the design criteria are established. Some of the 
criteria that must be established before undertaking a design a re  
(1) Structural factors of safety 
(2) Electronic parts derating policy 
(3) Codes or standards 
(4) Functional specifications 
(5) Environmental specifications 
(6) Duty cycle 
(7) Electromagnetic interference 
Many of these criteria a re  self-explanatory. Others a re  a little more involved, 
for example, electronic parts derating. Such parts normally have a service voltage 
and power specified by the manufacturer. The basis for the rating i s  somewhat ob- 
scure, and the physics of failure i s  not well understood. It is known that in solid- 
state devices, for example, there is a premium on small size of the part and that 
the failure mechanism is somehow related to operating temperature. By test, it  
has been established that, if the power level at which a part is  used is cut by half, 
the frequency of random failure i s  reduced by a factor of 5 or  better. Therefore, 
as a design criterion, it is stipulated that all such parts be used at  no more than 
about 0.7 the specified voltage and current level. (The actual numbers vary with 
the type of part under consideration.) When it i s  recognized that a typical launch 
vehicle contains about 300 000 parts, most of them electronic, the product of all 
those one-fifth's in failure rate has great significance. 
shock, and temperature are easily envisaged. Space systems must also contend 
with the salt-water atmosphere at the launch complex in Florida and the potential 
for growth of fungus in a hot and humid environment. 
Considerations such as these lead to what may be termed a design margin of 
safety. It establishes the degree of conservatism built into the system. Among the 
duties of reliability engineers is that of providing the data on which to base the de- 
sign criteria. 
Environment plays a major role in how a system will perform. Vibration, 
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Design Practice 
Once the criteria a re  established, t 
bility engineer i s  an important participa 
the design process, he has the responsibility for ensuring that proper design prac- 
tices are employed. This involves more than assuring adherence to the design cri- 
teria, it also includes, among others: (1) making sure that as few different varie- 
ties of parts as possible are used; (2) recognition of critical functions that would 
benefit from provision of redundancy in the system; and (3) making sure that, when 
a new technique or  component is applied, there is  a real need for it and that it is not 
just a manifestation of the designer's normal desire to do something new. In addi- 
tion, he conducts a reliability analysis of the system. This analysis takes the sta- 
tistical information on the failure rates of piece parts and projects the probability 
of failure of the systems components. Although the answers a re  expressed in prob- 
abilities, with lots of nines following the decimal point, the absolute numbers are 
not that important. What is important is the relative standing of the elements of the 
design. If an element is calculated to be significantly less reliable than most others, 
it is a candidate for redesign and/or redundancy. Redundancy, although frequently 
desirable and useful, is not a cure-all. Sometimes addition of redundancy can 
cause more trouble than it cures. Recognition of this when it occurs is the province 
of the reliability engineer. Examination of the design for proper design practice is 
a continuous part of the design process. 
sign process can 
system design. During all phas 
Design Reviews 
Another important element of the reliability engineering process is the design 
review. Design reviews are  normally conducted at three points during the design 
process. The first one is the conceptual design review, which occurs relatively 
early in the cycle. A t  this point, the basic elements of the system a re  selected, 
and the mechanization schemes to satisfy the fundamental requirements are estab- 
lished. Preliminary design follows during which parts are selected, specifications 
are drafted, and preliminary drawings are made. 
A t  this point, the intermediate design review takes place. During this process 
all the design data and schematics are reviewed to establish that the system can do 
the required job and that the components or parts selected satisfy the design cri- 
teria. When this has been established, a very important step begins. This is the 
failure mode and effects analysis of the proposed design. The design is examined 
to answer the following questions : 
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(1) How can a part or component fail? 
(2) For each mode of failure -what effect does it have on system pe 
(3) How critical is this 
(4) Can the problem be 
Basically, the failure mode analysis asks "what if?" and attempts to answer the 
question. To illustrate the sort  of thinking involved, consider the schematic of a 
launch vehicle hydraulic system shown in figure 4-1. A s  can be seen, it is basi- 
cally a simple system. A pump takes hydraulic fluid from a reservoir, raises its 
pressure, and passes i t  through a check valve to the engine gimbal actuator, whence 
it returns to the reservoir. The system pressures are measured by three trans- 
ducers, two on the high-pressure side and the other on the return side. During the 
failure mode analysis, the question was asked: "What if a high-pressure transducer 
fails?" The transducer that had been selected was examined. I t  is shown in fig- 
ure 4-2. It consists of a spirally wound Bourdon tube that moves a potentiometer. 
The working pressure of the system is 3000 psi; the gage was rated to 0 to 3500 psi. 
It seemed as if this was sufficient margin. The weakest point in the Bourdon tube is 
where it is brazed to the inlet fitting. If this were to break, the case of the trans- 
ducer would be subjected to full line pressure and, for the instrument that had been 
selected, would fail because the electrical connector was  merely soldered on to the 
case. In a short time all the supply of fluid would be exhausted overboard, and con- 
trol of the vehicle would be lost. This possibility was, of course, totally unaccep- 
table and was avoided by selecting a transducer case that could withstand full line 
pressure in the event of a failure of the sensing element. It was tolerable to lose a 
measurement, but not the whole vehicle. 
This is not a hypothetical situatiou. It actually existed in a vehicle design and 
probably would have gone unnoticed if the design had not been subjected to a failure 
mode analysis. 
A s  a result of such work at all levels of the design, the system design i s  modi- 
fied to provide inherent reliability. One other important element is provided from 
the results of such analyses. That is, as each potential failure mode is identified, 
the test requirements for acceptance testing are established. These should be se- 
lected so that each of the modes can be detected. Thus, some of the instrumenta- 
tion requirements for the system a re  established. 
Following the detailed design of the system, everything is examined again in the 
final design review. This repetition is required because, at this juncture, the phys- 
ical arrangement of the hardware has been established and this may have altered the 
intent of the design as established during the intermediate design review. 
occurred. It was decided to provide redundant gates in a particular circuit of an 
Figure 4-3 illustrates the sort  of problem that can arise. Again, this actually 
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autopilot because its criticality. The 
of the figure. A s  be seen, if one of 
through - just what was wanted. When this wa 
design, however, the situatio 
It looks, schematically, just 1 
of a single integrate 
to fail, both gates w 
fore not attained. The solution is shown by the dashed lines. In this case, the sec- 
ond gate was provided on another integrated circuit chip, and true redundancy was 
obtained. It is to uncover deficiencies like this that final design reviews are held. 
A s  may be inferred from the examples given, it takes a special "breed of cat1* 
to be a good reliability engineer. He must be a highly competent engineer, versed 
in design analysis, knowledgeable of how things are done in the "real world, I t  and 
have the patience of Job. When such a paragon has been found, there is a most 
important thing that should not be done with him. That is, he must not be put to 
work for the project manager. He must not be subject to the pressures on the pro- 
ject to meet costs and schedules. He must be free to "nit pick" and to act as the 
conscience of the project. In NASA, the reliability engineer works with the project 
manager but out of an independent office that reports to the Center director. 
t probably fail. The desired redundancy was there- 
Testing 
After the final design review and the resultant design modifications, the first 
item can be built. Despite all the effort described, not a thing has been built; that 
is, nothing resembling the final design has been made. Frequently, as part of the 
design process, a breadboard setup is made. This is really a design tool - an ana- 
log simulation of the schematic to determine, for example, whether a complex cir- 
cuit will function as intended. 
rotype, this is normally built in an experimental shop. With it the first step in 
proving the reliability of the system is taken. The testing that is conducted is 
called design evaluation testing and is very similar to the formal qualification pro- 
The first item that resembles the flight item is the engineering model or  pro- 
gram. 
(1) 
The nature of the testing is as follows: 
Functional tests 
(a) Design condition 
(b) Specification range, off standard 
(c) Tests for marginality 
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(2) Environmental tests 
(b) Thermal combined where possible 
(a) Pressure 
(e) Vibration 
(d) Shock 
(e) Atmosphere 
(f) Electromagnetic interference 
(g) -in 
(h) Sand 
(i) Fungus, etc. 
(3) Stress limit tests 
(4) Life tests 
(a) Specified life 
(b) Extended life e4 
} 
I t  is important to note that the applicable portions of the tests listed are con- 
ducted at various levels of the hardware, that is, first on the piece parts, then on 
the components or modules, next on subsystems, and, finally, at the system level. 
Ultimately, if at all possible, similar tests a re  conducted at the combined systems 
level, that is, all-up with all systems interacting. The tests are  described briefly 
in the following paragraphs. 
designed and are  conducted at both nominal conditions and over the range of speci- 
fied operating conditions, that is, over the range of inputs for which the system 
should perform properly. After this, the variables a re  permitted to exceed the 
specifications to determine whether a marginal condition exists; that is, whether 
an input slightly out of specification will cause the system to fail o r  malfunction. 
When this series is completed, the environmental testing phase begins. The 
system is subjected, while operating, to the types of environments that it will  ex- 
perience in service. In qualification testing, the sBecimen is normally subjected to 
environmental conditions more severe than it would be expected to encounter in 
service. For example, in vibration testing it is normally required that the design 
be capable of surviving at least 12 times the expected flight vibration levels. 
If it is at all possible, the environmental tests are conducted under combined 
environments such as the system will actually experience. On a launch vehicle, for  
example, a subsystem, or  "black box, '* will be subjected simultaneously to vibra- 
tion, thermal changes, and ambient pressure changes. The tests a re  designed so 
that these factors a re  applied as they would occur in flight. 
failure. Appropriate portions of the test program are repeated to prove the "fix" 
First come the functional tests. These tests prove that the system can work as 
1 
If something fails during such tests, design changes a re  made to preclude such 
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before proceeding to other parts of the program. 
When the environmental tests have been completed 
enters the s t ress  limit test. In 
creased. For example, the temperature level at which 
is extended on both high and low sides, to ascertain at  what temperature it malfunc- 
tions. This type of test determines any critical weakness o r  marginality in the de- 
sign and establishes the actually achieved design margins. 
tion at the anticipated environment. This is really a sort  of fatigue test during 
which the time it takes for a system to "wear out" is ascertained. 
When the prototype and all of i ts  parts have successfully completed the tests 
with all the modifications incorporated, the next step can begin; that is, the draw- 
ings and process specifications a re  released to the production department for manu- 
facture. The first few itemsaproduced in these shops are then subjected to the 
whole gamut of tests, this time for formal qualification. Recall that the prototype 
hardware was built in an experimental shop and that there is a vast difference be- 
tween it and a production shop. This series of tests on the production hardware is 
viewed as qualifying both the hardware built in the production shop and the shop it- 
self. When all these tests have been successfully completed, the design is consid- 
ered to be qualified for flight. 
test, the input levels are 
The last type of test listed, the life test, consists of repetitive cycles of opera- 
Q UALlTY AS SU RANCE 
After  all of the effort that went into the design and qualification process just de- 
scribed, it would seem that the problems are over and all that has to be done is to 
build or  buy the product of all this work. Unfortunately, this is not the case. The 
system must be policed to ensure that the product will be precisely as designed. 
This is the function of the quality assurance program. The tools of this discipline 
include specifications, process control, inspection, acceptance testing at all lev- 
els , a closed-loop failure analysis and corrective-action system, and stock con- 
trols. In order to get a high-quality product each of these tools must be employed 
in a rigorous manner. 
Specifications 
First, consider the specifications that govern the items that are built or pur- 
chased. I t  is important that these be written as completely and precisely as pos- 
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sible. They should contain negative a s  we1 positive statements. It must be re- 
membered that you get only what you cont 
The following example shows how an 
trouble. In an autopilot, a large number of a part 
ployed. It had been a long, hard task to qualify a particular vendor's p 
this application, and the systems were working wonderfully. Suddenly, the autopilot 
began to experience unexplainable functional failures during testing. Nothing had 
been changed; all parts were being purchased to the specifications always used, and 
the manufacturing processes employed in the electronics shop were the same and 
were being followed carefully. Af te r  extensive testing, all elements had been elimi- 
nated as the source of the problem, except this type of transistor. After  some inves- 
tigation it was found that, without notification, the vendor had "improved" his prod- 
uct. Figure 4-4 shows the gain characteristics of the transistor. The solid curve 
shows the gain as a function of the collector current of the original part. The dashed 
curve shows the characteristics after the improvement. The difference is apparent. 
The purchase specification required that the gain at a specific current lie in the 
range enclosed by the circle. It did not say that the gain at lower currents should 
follow the solid curve. This had been considered an implicit characteristic of the 
device. Because many of the transistors in the autopilot actually operated at a 
much lower current (as shown by the dashed vertical line), the change of gain by a 
factor of 2 drew the circuits into instability. The new model transistor still met 
the specifications as written, and the vendor, who did not know the application, had 
no idea of the trouble a normal product improvement would cause. The specifica- 
tions now state "No changes without telling us. 
Inspection 
Inspection is a vital element of quality assurance. In the qualification tests, 
not only is a design being qualified, but the manufacturer and the manufacturing 
process are also being qualified. bThe item must always be made in the same fash- 
ion in which the one that was qualified was made. This requires that inspection be 
thorough, that the most critical items are identified for special attention? and that 
strict adherence to all process specifications be maintained. 
A t  one time, an inspector was a highly skilled, experienced? and capable 
craftsman who could perform all the tasks he was called on to inspect. Unfortu- 
nately, this is no longer generally true. Inspectors frequently do not understand 
what they are looking for. They merely follow instructions, and these, perforce, 
cannot completely describe what constitutes a good piece of work. 
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For this reason, reliance 
posal - testing. Everything us 
gram at all hardware levels. The testing encompasses both functional and environ- 
mental tests. In fact, the tests are very similar to their counterparts during quali- 
fication testing. The principal difference is that the environmental levels are nor- 
mally limited to what the expected service levels will  be. The value of acceptance 
testing under appropriate environmental conditions cannot be overemphasized. 
Again, an example will illustrate the point. 
being excessively noisy and exhibiting abnormal vibration. The pump is a conven- 
tional constant -pressure, positive -displacement, variable -flow device. A sample 
of hydraulic oil from the pump-case drain port contained a large number of bronze- 
colored particles and several pieces of broken ball-bearing retainer. Upon disas- 
sembly, it was found that the pump cylinder block bearing had been installed back- 
ward with the thrust face away from the bearing retainer. A sketch of the bearing 
is shown in the left of figure 4-5. Note the asymmetry of the bearing. The pump 
vendor's assembly instructions stated "Assemble with face marked THRUST next to 
bearing retainer. '' This marking is shown in the right of the figure. The outer 
race can support only minimal thrust in the reverse direction. When the pump was 
under test, the bearing broke. So much for the quality of the inspection. A s  this 
pump is not run until the rocket engine turbopump drives it at engine ignition and 
the pump does not fail immediately, it would have done so during flight and would 
have caused a mission failure. Only the acceptance tests prevented the improperly 
assembled pump from being installed on a vehicle. 
During the acceptance flow response test, an hydraulic pump was rejected as 
Failure Analysis and Corrective Action 
A necessary concomitant of any testing is a dosed-loop failure analysis and 
corrective -action system. Unfortunately, design and manufacturing techniques are 
not infallible, and despite all the effort applied to preclude it, a subtle design de- 
ficiency may sneak through and cause trouble. When something malfunctions in a 
test, it is not enough to f ix  the one item and then proceed. It is vital that the cause 
of the failure be identified and corrective action be taken on all such devices. A 
subtle design deficiency and the failure analysis and corrective action taken a re  il- 
lustrated in figure 4-6. 
This figure depicts an electrohydraulic servovalve that controls the engine 
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gimbal actuators. Basically, it is a differential electric motor driving a pilot valve 
that ports hydraulic oil to either side of a working cylinder to move the engine. The 
three leads shown carry the current for moving the electric motor in response to 
commands from the autopilot servoamplifier. 
through with flying colors. During acceptance testing of a batch of these valves, 
one of them failed during the vibration test. The failure was a short circuit is one 
of the three wires  to the motor. What had happened is shown in the photograph in 
figure 4-6. Notice how the three wires are pinched between the pole piece of the 
motor and the case. Upon investigation, it was found that the gap between the case 
and pole piece through which the wires  from the armature had come was not quite 
big enough for a single wire .  Thus, when the motor was assembled, the wires were 
slightly pinched. The amount of pinching involved was not enough to break through 
the insulation, however. The insulation is Teflon, and this material is subject to 
cold flow. When the valve was assembled at the vendor's plant, it sucessfully 
passed his tests. The pinched insulation, however, continued to flow. During the 
acceptance test, the added vibration (which is like that which would be encountered 
in flight) completed the insulation flow, and the short occurred. In flight, such a 
failure would have been catastrophic. 
The failure analysis showed that, in the process of assembling the valve, the 
motor leads a re  soldered to a bulkhead connector and then the connector and wires 
This valve had been subjected to a thorough qualification program and had come 
a re  pushed into the case and the connector is screwed in place. Unless care is 
taken during this step, it is easy for the wires to slip out of the proper feedthrough 
area and be pinched over the sharp edge of the pole pieces. A number of steps 
were taken to correct this situation. First, the edge of the pole piece, which had 
been square and relatively sharp, was given a generous radius. And second, special 
assembly instructions and inspection callouts were implemented. 
The most important aspect of this incident is the fact that a failure analysis was 
conducted. It would have been very easy to simply reject the valve and send it back 
to the manufacturer. Such action would, however, have left the valve with a large 
potential for catastrophic failure in a future flight. 
lems within a single component or  "black box. '' Another important factor to con- 
sider is that of interactions or  interfaces among systems. Whenever there is an 
interface, there is a potential for an incompatibility that can lead to trouble. Fig- 
ure 4-7 illustrates a problem of this nature. This example demonstrates the im- 
portance of failure analysis as well as the pitfalls of an interface. 
The figure shows a schematic of a portion of the propellant utilization system 
of a launch vehicle. The function of this system is to regulate the ratio of fuel and 
Most of the preceding discussion and examples have been concerned with prob- 
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oxidizer flows to the rocket engine so that the supply of both prop 
at  the same time. The portion of the system circuit shown is tha 
ror  detector and the fuel valve controller. The solid lines are th 
ration. This is basically a very simple circuit. The information tap provided a 
means for measuring the output of the error  detector. The signal went to both the 
telemetry system on the vehicle and through a landline to a recording instrument in 
the blockhouse. It was noticed during prelaunch testing that, when the umbilicals 
were ejected, a shift in the e r ror  signal was indicated by the telemetry signal. Al -  
though the shift was relatively minor, it should not have occurred. A failure analy- 
sis was instituted. A detailed analysis of the circuit at  the launch site showed that, 
when the umbilicals were connected, the instrumentation in the blockhouse was 
loading the circuit and introducing a bias which evidenced itself when the umbilical 
connection was broken. A s  the vehicle was checked out in supposedly the same way 
in the factory, the obvious question was  "Why didn't this show up then ?" The ans- 
wer  was, quite simply, that the combined impedance of the blockhouse instrument 
and long line a t  the launch site was  much different from that of the equipment used 
in the factory. The factory gear did not load the circuit. This is an almost classic 
example of the importance of using the same type of test gear in both the factory 
and field - an interface problem. Thus, the problem of the error  signal shift was 
resolved. 
While the problem was being investigated, it became obvious that, i f  there were 
a failure in the instrumentation system, it could cause a failure of the propellant 
utilization system. The original instrumentation line went directly to the telemetry 
set. If a short developed in the telemeter, the output of the error  signal would be 
shorted, and control of the fuel valve would be lost. Thus, the desire o r  need for 
information of system performance parameters resulted in a design that introduced 
an unacceptable failure mode. Fortunately, the solution for both problems was 
st5aightforwax-d and is shown by the small-dashed lines. The error signal was 
picked up as shown and fed through isolating resistors. The resistors serve two 
purposes. First, they provide a high impedance ratio so that the instruments can 
no longer load the circuit. Second, they isolate the instrumentation system from 
ths  propellant utilization system so that, if there is a short in the information sys- 
tem, it will not destroy the functional system. 
This concludes our brief tour through a chamber of horrors. These a re  but a 
few examples of the sort  of problems that the methodology NASA has evolved has 
helpeaprevent o r  catch. Although most of the examples have been of an electrical 
nature, a similar set concerned with purely mechanical components could have been 
used. 
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Operational Testing 
The reliability and quality assurance program does not 
hardware through the acceptance test at the factory at the s 
tinues all the way to launch and throughout the flight. 
Af te r  the subsystems have been through their individual acceptance tests, they 
a r e  assembled onto the vehicle in the factory and each system is tested. When the 
systems tests are completed satisfactorily, a combined systems test is conducted 
with all systems being required to operate while interacting with each other as they 
would in flight. (Ideally, this should be done in a simulated flight environment.) 
Only when this test has been passed is the vehicle ready to ship to the launch site. 
At the launch site, the systems level tests a re  repeated to determine whether 
any damage or  degradation has occurred during transportation and to prove that the 
airborne hardware is  compatible with the ground-support equipment. Then a series 
of composite tests is undertaken to again demonstrate the integrity of the vehicle. 
Typically, there a r e  three composite tests during which everything that will happen 
during launch and flight, short of actually igniting the engines, is checked out. 
When all this testing i s  over, a data and readiness review i s  held. Each box, 
or major component, has a "history jacket'' which documents its life story during 
manufacturing and testing. The data from all tests a r e  now reviewed to ascertain 
whether each system is, and has been, performing within specifications and whether 
the data exhibit any trends indicative of deterioration - even if all readings are 
within specifications. Only when each system proves to be acceptable on the basis 
of all testing, is it considered ready for flight. 
the systems performed as predicted and whether any anomalies occurred. 
Subsequent to flight, all data from the flight are  evaluated to ascertain whether 
CQNCLUDING REMARKS 
The reliability and quality assurance program described briefly herein is, how- 
ever, no panacea. It can lead to a paper blizzard because all the things that a re  
discovered n u s t  be documented and communicated in the hope of precluding a re- 
currence. This can lead to a reliance on paper rather than on sound engineering 
evaluation and judgement. The program does help to reduce the frequency of unde- 
tected human er rors  but, alas, does not eliminate them. Also, it takes money, 
sometimes a lot of it, but it can save much more - and that makes it worthwhile. 
What has been learned in the struggle to achieve reliability? 
First, testing is the most potent and least expensive aspect of the program 
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when measured against the cost of a fli 
quired to perform full-systems environmental t 
while, the ability to test the hardware of both s 
was comparable. Now, spacecraft can be more effectively tes 
is compatible with existing environmental facilities. It is now standard practice to 
put the whole spacecraft into an environmental chamber wherein almost the total 
flight environment can be simulated. We look forward to the day when the launch 
vehicles may be tested in the same manner. 
gins must be a conscious part  of the design effort. 
dures and test equipment are part  of the design process - they are just a s  important 
in achieving reliability a s  the functional design of the flight hardware. 
Finally, it is essential to police the manufacturing and test processes. Close 
adherence to procedures is mandatory. Parts should be standardized as much as 
possible, and good housekeeping practices must be followed at all times and places. 
A s  stated at  the beginning, all that NASA does to achieve reliability may not be 
applicable to the electric power industry. However, the two fields have a basic 
similarity. Both a r e  engaged in activities that are characterized by small build 
rates of the ultimate end item - be it a powerplant o r  a launch vehicle. But there 
are many components and subsystems that a r e  common to many installations. Per- 
haps group action within the industry in the design and specifications of such com- 
mon elements would be an effective way of reducing the cost to an individual com- 
pany of implementing reliability and quality assurance requirements on purchased 
items. 
even more difficult to improve. It is hoped that the experience of NASA will in some 
way be of value to the electric power industry. 
The equipment and facilities re- 
Second, designs must possess adequate margins of safety. Getting such mar- 
Third, testability must be designed into the hardware. Also, the test proce- 
High reliability has been difficult to attain, just a s  difficult to maintain, and 
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Figure 4-1. - Launch vehicle hydraulic system. 
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Figure 4-2. - Pressure transducer, 0 to 3Mo psia. 
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Figure 4-3. - Schematic of autopilot circuit  gating. 
’”[ 150 
I 
1000 
Figure 4-4. -Transistor characteristics. 
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Figure 4-5. - Hydraulic pump bearing. Arrows show correct direction for loading races, 
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Figure 4-6. - Electrohydraulic servovalve for engine gimbal control. 
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